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ZONING AND LAND USE
Arthur J. Anderson*
1. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article covers cases from the Survey period which the author
believes are noteworthy because they added to the jurisprudence
on Zoning and Land Use. The author is indebted to Barry Knight
and Tommy Mann for their assistance with the review of cases and draft-
ing portions of this Article.
II. ANNEXATION
The right of landowners to trigger arbitration in an involuntary annexa-
tion was addressed in City of Rockwall v. Hughes.' The City of Rockwall
("Rockwall") sought to annex land under the "sparsely populated" ex-
emption from the three year "annexation plan" requirement contained in
chapter 43 of the Texas Local Government Code, however, the owner
claimed that Rockwall was circumventing the requirement.2 Pursuant to
section 43.052(i), the owner requested arbitration of the dispute.3 Rock-
wall responded that the proposed annexations were exempt from the
three year plan and the request for arbitration was not appropriate.4 Af-
ter the trial court granted Rockwall's plea to the jurisdiction and dis-
missed the case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court.5 The court
of appeals found that the plain language of chapter 43 provides that "if
the City [of Rockwall] fails to take action on the petition to include the
area in the three year annexation plan, the landowner may request arbi-
tration of the dispute."'6
Because the case involved statutory construction, the Texas Supreme
Court reviewed the legal question de novo.7 In a five-to-four decision,
the supreme court held that the Rockwall's refusal of the request for arbi-
tration and finding that the proposed annexations were exempt from the
three year plan, was an "action" pursuant to the statute. 8 The supreme
court stated that ". . . [O]ur standard for construing statutes is not to
* B.B.A. Austin College, M.P.A., J.D., University of Texas; Shareholder, Winstead
P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008).
2. Id. at 625.
3. See TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(i) (Vernon 2008).
4. See § 43.052.
5. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d at 623.
6. Id. (emphasis excluded).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 631.
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measure them for logic... our standard is to construe statutes to effectu-
ate the intent of the Legislature, with the language of the statute as it was
exacted to be our guide unless the context or an absurd result requires
another construction."9 It further held that the landowner has the right
to seek a quo warranto action brought by the attorney general or district
or county attorney to challenge the annexation, and the Legislature has
the opportunity to amend the statute if it so desires.' 0 The dissent stated
that the majority espoused sound principles of statutory construction but
misapplied them by taking "literalism too literally."" The dissent found
that, "[r]ead naturally, section 43.052(i) means [that] landowners who re-
quest inclusion of their land in the city's annexation plan may arbitrate
the city's failure to include it. ' '12
The appellate opinion in In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, LLP 13 was
issued prior to Hughes. The Town of Little Elm (the "Town") proposed
to annex property without including it in the town's three year annexa-
tion plan. After the landowner sent the Town a letter asking that its
property be included in the three year annexation plan in accordance
with section 43.052(i), the Town Council voted not to include the land in
the three year annexation plan and to proceed with fast track annexation.
The landowner, pursuant to section 43.052(i) of the Texas Local Govern-
ment Code, petitioned the Town for arbitration. The Town placed an
agenda item to consider annexation of the property, and the owner
sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to restrain the Town from
taking steps to annex the property.' 4
After the trial court denied the TRO application, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to re-
verse its order denying the TRO until the issue of arbitration could be
decided by the court. 15 Relying on the Dallas Court of Appeals decision
in City of Rockwall v. Hughes,'16 the court held that a party has a privately
enforceable, statutory right to arbitrate a dispute under Section
43.052(i). 17 "[A]fter annexation occurs, an arbitration would be meaning-
less as [the] landowner could not maintain a private action to disannex
the property."' 18 The case settled before the Texas Supreme Court de-
cided City of Rockwall v. Hughes.
In City of Cresson v. City of Granbury,19 both the City of Cresson
("Cresson") and the City of Granbury ("Granbury") claimed jurisdiction
over certain property. Granbury began the annexation process by adopt-
9. Id. at 629.
10. Id. at 631.
11. Id. (Willett, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. 218 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
14. Id. at 891-93.
15. Id. at 901.
16. 153 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005), rev'd, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2005).
17. In re Spiritas Ranch, 218 S.W.3d at 898.
18. Id.
19. 245 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. granted).
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ing a resolution directing its staff to prepare a service plan and call two
sets of public hearings to accomplish a series of five one-mile annexations
along State Highway 377, a process upheld in City of Longview v. State ex
rel. Springhill Utility District.20 The Granbury resolution provided for the
annexations to be implemented in sequential order with the first annexa-
tion within Granbury's one mile extraterritorial jurisdiction ("ETJ"). Af-
ter Granbury passed the resolution but before completing the annexation
process, several property owners outside of Granbury's ETJ petitioned to
have their land included within Cresson's ETJ in accordance with chapter
42 of the Texas Local Government Code. Cresson approved four ordi-
nances accepting the land owners' petitions. Cresson's one-half mile ETJ
expanded accordingly. Subsequently, Granbury passed five annexation
ordinances and claimed jurisdiction over the disputed property. After the
trial court held for Granbury, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed
and rendered judgment for Cresson.2a
The court held that the common law first in time rule-that the first
municipality to begin the annexation procedures on unclaimed territory
obtains exclusive jurisdiction over that property-was inapplicable after
the passage of the Municipal Annexation Act.22 "A municipality may not
annex land included within another municipality's ETJ without the other
municipality's consent."'23 Because the property owners petitioned Cres-
son to include their properties within Cresson's ETJ and Cresson adopted
appropriate ordinances before Granbury could pass its ordinances, Gran-
bury's final four annexation ordinances were void. The court also found
that Cresson did not violate the Open Meetings Act2 4 and enjoined Gran-
bury from continuing to assert jurisdiction over the disputed tracts.25
III. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
Identifying the correct parties in a judicial appeal of a Board of Adjust-
ment decision was addressed in Tellez v. City of Socorro.26 The owner of
a salvage yard petitioned for writ of certiorari and declaratory relief
against the City of Socorro ("Socorro") seeking review of the Board of
Adjustment's (the "Board's") denial of an application for a nonconform-
ing use permit.27 After the trial court affirmed the Board's decision, the
El Paso Court of Appeals dismissed the suit because the property owner's
failed to name the Board as a party and specify how the Board's decision
was illegal. 28 The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that section
20. 657 S.W.2d 430, 431 n.2 (Tex. 1983).
21. City of Cresson, 245 S.W.3d at 63.
22. Id. at 65-66. The Municipal Annexation Act is now codified at TEX. Loc. Gov'T
CODE ANN. §§ 43.001-.907 (Vernon 2008).
23. City of Cresson, 245 S.W.3d at 66; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 551.002, 551.043
(Vernon 2004 & Vernon Supp. 2008).
24. City of Cresson, 245 S.W.3d at 68-69.
25. Id. at 72.
26. 226 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. 2007) (per curium).




211.011(a)-(c) of the Texas Local Government Code requires such chal-
lenges to be filed within ten days of a Board's decision by verified peti-
tion that avers the decision of the Board is illegal and specifies the
grounds for the illegality.29 However, the court found that whether the
suit should be dismissed because the Board was not joined as a defendant
is a prudential rather than a judicial question, and that nothing indicates
the Legislature intended that specific allegations of illegality to be juris-
dictional. 30 The Court found that Socorro never objected and its failure
to do so waived any defect.31 This case seemingly overrules years of pre-
cedent first established by Reynolds v. Haws, 32 which held that the Board
of Adjustment is an indispensable party, that the failure to timely file a
petition naming the Board as a party defendant is jurisdictional, and that
such a case must be dismissed.33
IV. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Procedural requirements for bringing a takings claim were addressed in
Halico Texas, Inc. v. McMullen County.34 Hallco Texas, Inc. ("Hallco")
claimed, inter alia, that McMullen County's (the "County's") denial of a
variance from an ordinance prohibiting landfills within three miles of a
water supply reservoir was an unconstitutional taking of property. The
trial court and court of appeals granted summary judgment for the
County, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed in a five-to-three deci-
sion, finding the causes of action were barred by res judicata.35
In 1995, Hallco initially brought a takings claim in state and federal
court challenging the County's ordinance, but the County alleged the tak-
ing claim was not ripe. The trial court and court of appeals denied
Hallco's taking claim, finding that the regulation did not deprive Hallco
of a protected property interest.36 Hallco's federal claim was dismissed
without prejudice for lack of ripeness because Hallco did not pursue its
state law claims.37 Hallco did not appeal the court of appeals'
determination.
Two years later, Hallco brought a variance request permitting it to op-
erate its landfill in spite of the ordinance enacted by the county commis-
sioners. 38 After the County's subsequent denial of the request and
resulting litigation, the supreme court found that Hallco should have
brought all of its claims in its original litigation. Hallco's failure to plead
the variance issue in the original case barred the claim in the later case. 39
29. Id.; see TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE Ar. § 211.011 (Vernon 2008).
30. Tellez, 226 S.W.3d at 414.
31. Id.
32. 741 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied).
33. Id. at 588.
34. 221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006).
35. Id. at 54, 62.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 55.
39. Id. at 60-61.
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The dissent found that Hallco was "whipsaw[ed]" by the County's ripe-
ness defense in the initial case.40 The dissent would hold the County to
its ripeness defense and allow Hallco to proceed with its takings claim.4 1
The Waco Court of Appeals reached a slightly different result in Trail
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston.4 2 The City of Houston ("Houston")
passed an ordinance prohibiting oil drilling on the property of Trail En-
terprises, Inc. (the "Trail") near Lake Houston. After the jury deter-
mined the amount of Trail's damages, the trial court determined that
Trail's claims were not ripe and dismissed the claims. The court of ap-
peals reversed and rendered. 43 Houston's counsel argued that Trail's
claim was not ripe because a formal permit application had not been sub-
mitted. However, the court of appeals held that Trail's claims were ripe
upon enactment of the ordinance. 44
The Texas Supreme Court addressed both regulatory takings and es-
toppel claims in City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Properties.4 5 In
1999, the City of San Antonio ("San Antonio") began blocking access
from the driveway for a business park to a city street. TPLP Office Park
Properties, Inc. ("TPLP") had developed an office park fronting on Inter-
state 10 ("1-10") in San Antonio city limits. There was limited access to I-
10, and the plat for the office park showed a driveway connecting to Freil-
ing Drive ("Freiling"). In response to neighborhood complaints about
increased traffic on Freiling, San Antonio decided to close the street ac-
cess. The owner of the private driveway filed suit, seeking a declaratory
judgment and an injunction preventing San Antonio from blocking the
driveway's access to the street.46 The trial court declared that San
Antonio was estopped as a matter of law from closing the street access
because doing so was an unreasonable exercise of its police power and
would result in a compensable taking of TPLP's property rights.47 The
court of appeals affirmed.4 8 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "[San Antonio's] decision and actions to close access between the
private driveway and the street constituted a proper exercise of [San
Antonio's] police power" and "closing the access would not constitute a
compensable taking."'49
With respect to the denial of access issue, the supreme court stated that
"access to a business was not materially and substantially impaired when
one access point was closed, but another access point on a public street
40. Id. at 63 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 78.
42. 255 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. filed).
43. Id. at 108.
44. Id. at 109.
45. 218 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id. at 61-62.
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id. at 62.
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remained unaffected." 50 The supreme court further noted that, "[i]f the
access to Freiling [was] closed, at least six points of egress and ingress
along the 1-10 access road [would] remain at the front of the business
park. '51 Even though the remaining access points were inconvenient,
there was not a substantial impairment of access and thus no inverse
condemnation. 5
2
Finally, San Antonio argued that the trial court and the court of ap-
peals erred in holding that it was estopped from closing the driveway's
access to Freiling.5 3 With regard to estoppel, the supreme court indicated
that "in exceptional cases a city may be estopped from taking certain ac-
tions where circumstances demand application of the doctrine to prevent
manifest injustice."'54 "[E]ven if doing justice would otherwise warrant
applying principles of estoppel, courts will not apply the doctrine if doing
so interferes with a city's ability to perform its governmental functions.
55
TPLP argued that justice required application of the doctrine of estoppel
in this case because San Antonio approved the plat depicting the drive-
way in 1975, and TPLP relied on the plat to confirm access to the prop-
erty when it decided to purchase the property and spend over one million
dollars on improvements. 56 Although these facts indicated a situation
that might warrant application of estoppel principles, 57 the supreme court
ruled that "estopping a City (sic) from employing its chosen method to
regulate traffic would improperly interfere with [San Antonio's] perform-
ance of its governmental functions. '58 As a result, San Antonio was not
estopped from closing the driveway.
59
In another case, the city successfully defended an inverse condemna-
tion claim. In Park v. City of San Antonio,60 Park applied for and had
approved the rezoning of his property to allow for a golf driving range.
61
The City of San Antonio approved construction permits, and the site was
constructed. There was no record of a permit issued for the fence sur-
rounding the driving range. A storm destroyed the poles supporting
Park's forty-feet high netting fence around the driving range, and Park
applied for a new fence permit using metal poles. San Antonio denied
the permit because fences in the district were limited to six feet in height.
Park then applied to the Board of Adjustment for a variance and was
denied. Park brought suit for negligence, gross negligence and inverse
50. Id. at 66 (citing Archenhold Auto Supply Co. v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 111, 114
(Tex. 1965)).
51. Id. at 66.
52. Id. at 67.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Tex.
2006)).
55. Id. at 67 (citing Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 776).




60. 230 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, pet. denied).
61. Id. at 864.
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condemnation. 62 Relying heavily Park's application for the rezoning, the
court upheld summary judgment in favor of San Antonio on the negli-
gence claims and upheld the trial court's ruling for San Antonio on the
inverse condemnation claim, finding that all economically viable use of
the property was not taken.63
In Rowlett/2000, Ltd. v. City of Rowlett,64 a developer brought an in-
verse condemnation action against the City of Rowlett ("Rowlett") for
repeatedly denying rezoning applications for certain real estate.65 The
property was zoned as a single family lot with a minimum lot size of one
acre when the developer purchased it, and the rezoning applications were
for higher density single family developments similar to those adjacent to
the property. Appraisers for both the developer and Rowlett agreed that
the property was undevelopable under the one-acre zoning. Market
value for development of single family land in the area was approxi-
mately $25,000 an acre while the value under the one acre zoning was
only $2,500 an acre.66 The court held that the minimum lot size ordi-
nance did not deprive the developer of all economically viable use of the
property.67
In Howeth Investments, Inc. v. White,68 a developer sought to subdivide
a property into two flag lots. The Planning and Zoning Commission
failed to take action on the plat applications within thirty days and ulti-
mately denied the requests. 69 In addition to suing the City of Hedwig
Village, the developer also brought suit against the individual members of
the Commission for a state law regulatory taking because of the failure to
issue "no action certificates" and the wrongful denial of the applications.
In addition, the developer attempted to reserve its federal takings
claim.70 The case was severed and the appeal only dealt with the devel-
oper's ability to bring a suit against the individual Commission members.
The court of appeals held that the trial court, by granting summary judg-
ment, could not have addressed the reserved federal claim. 71 If the devel-
oper had abandoned its state takings claim against the individual
defendants, the trial court should have dismissed the claim without
prejudice instead of rendering a take-nothing summary judgment. 72
62. Id. at 864-65.
63. Id. at 869.
64. 231 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
65. Id. at 589.
66. Id. at 592-94.
67. Id. at 594.
68. 227 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 208.
71. Id. at 210.




City of Mont Belvieu v. Enterprise Products Operating, LP 73 addressed
whether the Legislature intended to fully preempt a municipality's au-
thority to regulate underground salt-dome hydrocarbon facilities. 74 En-
terprise Products Operating, LP ("Enterprise") obtained permits from
the Texas Railroad Commission ("TRCC") to operate and maintain an
underground hydrocarbon storage facility and to drill a well to access the
storage facility. The City of Mont Belvieu filed suit after Enterprise be-
gan site work because Enterprise had not obtained a drilling permit re-
quired by city ordinance, had violated zoning regulations, and had
created a nuisance. 75 Enterprise argued for preemption, and the trial
court granted its plea to the jurisdiction. The Houston Fourteenth Court
of Appeals held that preemption was an affirmative defense and was not
an appropriate issue to be resolved in a plea to the jurisdiction and re-
manded. 76 The court discussed the preemption issue and stated that the
city ordinance would only be preempted to the extent it conflicted with
the state statute with "unmistakable clarity."'77 "Simply because the Leg-
islature has enacted a law addressing a subject matter does not mean that
the Legislature completely preempted the subject matter. '78 In this case,
chapter 211 of the Texas Natural Resources Code did not state that the
Legislature has intended for the TRCC to have exclusive jurisdiction, and
it expressly stated that cities could retain regulatory authority.
79
VI. SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES
In Illusions-Dallas Private Club, Inc. v. Steen, 80 owners of sexually ori-
ented businesses ("SOB") located in designated dry areas challenged a
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code provision preventing them from re-
newing their permits as private clubs to serve alcohol. 8' The businesses
brought claims for denial of due process and First Amendment viola-
tions.82 The court stated that it did not even have to reach the question
of whether the permits constituted property interests because the Alco-
holic Beverage Code provision was generally applicable. As a result, the
due process rights of the businesses could not have been violated.
83
However, the court did recognize that the business owners had a viable
claim under the First Amendment. 84 The court applied intermediate
73. 222 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
74. Id. at 517-18.
75. Id. at 517.
76. Id. at 521-22.
77. Id. at 520.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 521; see TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 211.002(a), 211.011 (Vernon 2001).
80. 482 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007).
81. See TEX. ALCO. BEY. CODE ANN. § 32.03(k) (Vernon 2007).
82. Id. at 303-04.
83. Id. at 304.
84. Id. at 305.
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scrutiny to the law. 85 In particular, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code
provision was "constitutional if (1) the State regulated pursuant to a legit-
imate governmental power; (2) the regulation does not completely pro-
hibit adult entertainment; (3) the regulation is aimed not at the
suppression of expression, but rather at combating negative secondary
affects; and (4) the regulation is designed to serve a substantial govern-
mental interest, is narrowly tailored, and reasonable alternative avenues
of communication remain available, or, alternatively, the regulation fur-
thers an important or substantial government interest and the restriction
on expressive conduct is no greater than is essential in furtherance of that
interest. '86 The court found that the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commis-
sion had not advanced a substantial governmental interest in enforcing
the law. 87
Terminating a SOB was addressed in City of Arlington v. Centerfolds,
Inc.88 Centerfolds, Inc. ("Centerfolds") was operating a SOB before the
City of Arlington ("Arlington") enacted a prohibition on such operations
within 1,000 feet of a residence. SOBs in existence on the prohibition
date were allowed to apply for an exemption to the location restrictions
each year. Centerfolds had obtained a location exemption every year.
Centerfolds changed tenants at the location and was not operational for
several months. When it applied to renew its exemption after it re-
opened, the Amortization Appeal Board (the "Board") denied the appli-
cation. 89 The Board terminated the use, but the court held that
Centerfolds was denied procedural due process because witnesses at the
Board hearing were not allowed to be fully cross-examined. 90 An admin-
istrative decision is arbitrary and may be overturned if it does not comply
with procedural due process requirements. 91 Due process requires fair
play and the opportunity to cross examine witnesses. 92 Consequently, the
court ruled for Centerfolds and remanded the case finding the Board's
decision to be arbitrary and capricious and a denial of due process.93
Simply because a SOB is operational does not mean it is immune from
a new ordinance according to Smartt v. City of Laredo.94 Smartt operated
a SOB outside of Laredo's city limits, and in 1998, the City of Laredo
("Laredo") annexed his property. Later, Laredo amended its zoning or-
dinance to require SOB's to obtain licenses and to prevent their opera-
tion within 1,000 feet of a residential area. Smartt's business was located
within this barrier, and Laredo sued to enjoin the sexually-oriented busi-
ness use at the Smartt location. Smartt challenged the ordinance by
85. Id. at 307.
86. Id. at 311.
87. Id. at 315.
88. 232 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
89. Id. at 242.
90. Id. at 248.
91. Id. at 249.
92. Id. at 250-51.
93. Id. at 254.
94. 239 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. denied).
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claiming that his rights to use his property had been "grandfathered. ''95
The court relied on the Texas Supreme Court decision of City of Uni-
versity Park v. Benners96 to hold that Smartt's business had not been
grandfathered because zoning ordinances may be applied to terminate
previously existing nonconforming uses. 97 Next, Smartt challenged the
constitutionality of the Laredo ordinance as a violation of the First
Amendment. 98 The court relied on the United States Supreme Court de-
cision of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres99 for the rule that regula-
tions on the "time, place, and manner" of an activity are "content
neutral" and not abridgements of First Amendment freedom of
speech. 100 The court viewed the Laredo ordinance as a "content neutral"
law, and the decision of the lower court was affirmed. 1° 1
VII. VESTED RIGHTS
Chapter 245 of the Local Government Code is the state vested rights
statute. The definition of a "project" under the statute was addressed in
City of San Antonio v. En Seguido, Ltd.10 2 In 1971 a subdivision plat for
one lot on a twenty-seven acre tract of land was approved by the city. In
1999, the San Antonio Public Service confirmed that gas and electric ser-
vice was available to the area. The next year, the owner obtained a De-
velopment Rights Permit ("DRP") from the City's Planning Department,
and the San Antonio River Authority ("SARA") accepted the sanitary
sewer plan and profiles for the project. En Seguido, Ltd. ("El Seguido")
purchased the land in 2004 and then entered into a sewer agreement with
SARA and paid impact fees for 154 sewer connections. 10 3 When a dis-
pute arose between the landowner and the City of San Antonio with re-
spect to En Seguido's ability to rely on the 1971 land use regulations, a
lawsuit was filed. Following the filing of En Seguido's lawsuit, the trial
court entered a partial summary judgment in En Seguido's favor. 10 4
In its first issue on appeal, San Antonio argued that En Seguido did not
have any vested rights in development based on the 1971 plat because: (1)
En Seguido was not completing the same project identified and approved
in the 1971 plat; (2) the 1971 plat was not a required permit that would
trigger vested rights; and (3) the project contemplated in the 1971 plat
had become dormant.'0 5 En Seguido countered by stating that San
Antonio's interpretation of when rights vest is based on an overly narrow
reading of the term "project." En Seguido further responded that the
95. Id. at 870-71.
96. 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972).
97. Smartt, 239 S.W.3d at 871.
98. Id. at 872.
99. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
100. Smartt, 239 S.W.3d at 872.
101. Id. at 872-73.
102. 227 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet).
103. Id. at 239-40.
104. Id. at 240.
105. Id. at 241.
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1971 plat was a required permit and the project had not become dor-
mant. 0 6 The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that there was a mate-
rial fact issue as to whether the project identified in the 1971 plat was the
same as the current project. 10 7
The City of San Antonio also argued that the 1971 plat was not a re-
quired permit because it was for one lot, and no subdivision occurred
under chapter 212 of the Texas Local Government Code. 10 8 As a result,
"En Seguido did not have vested rights based on the 1971 plat because it
was not a required permit."1 0 9 According to the court, section 245.002(a)
does not refer to a required plan or plat.110 Further, preliminary plans
and plats are considered to be one series of permits for the project under
section 245.002(b).1 ' "Reading the two sections together, the filing of a
plan for development or plat application, including preliminary plans and
plats, gives rise to vested rights regardless of whether the plan or plat was
required to be filed. ' '112
Finally, San Antonio argued that there was no progress towards com-
pletion as of May 11, 2000, at which point the project became dormant."13
However, such an interpretation of this statute would strip a project of its
vested rights four years before the statutory deadline with no means to
restore dormant vested right."14 Section 245.005(a) mandates that the ex-
piration date for dormant projects can be "no earlier than the fifth anni-
versary of the effective date of this chapter.11 5 The court of appeals
rejected San Antonio's dormancy argument,"16 finding En Seguido or its
prior owners had taken actions to complete the project. According to the
court of appeals, section 245.005 is not an exhaustive list of the activities
that "can be considered in determining whether progress had been made
towards the completion of a project.' '" 7 While the record contained evi-
dence of actions to complete the project, the court found that "reasona-
ble people could differ as to whether the actions taken were sufficient to
constitute progress toward completion," and because a material fact issue
was involved, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.1' 8
The San Antonio Court of Appeals subsequently addressed the same
106. Id.
107. Id. at 243.
108. Id.; see TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 212.004 (Vernon 2008).
109. En Seguido, 227 S.W.3d at 243 (citing 2218 Bryan Street, Ltd. v. City of Dallas, 175
S.W.3d 58, 62-64 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); Levy v. City of Piano, No. 05-97-
00061-CV, 2001 WL 1382520, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 8, 2001, no pet.)); see TEX.
Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 245.002(a) (Vernon 2005).
110. En Seguido, 227 S.W.3d at 243; see TEX. Loc. GOVT CODE ANN. § 245.002(b).
111. En Seguido, 227 S.W.3d at 244.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 245.005(a) (Vernon 2005).
115. Id.
116. En Seguido, 227 S.W.3d at 245.
117. Id. at 244.
118. Id. at 245.
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issue in City of Helotes v. Miller.119 Miller owed approximately thirty-one
acres located in the City of Helotes's ("Helotes's") ETJ which he con-
tracted to sell to Wal-Mart. The sale was contingent upon Wal-Mart be-
ing able to develop the property for a "big box" retail store. Wal-Mart
obtained curb cut permits, a utility services agreement with SARA and
permits from Helotes. In 2005, Helotes initiated annexation proceedings
and Helotes passed a resolution opposing the Wal-Mart store. 120 The res-
olution stated the City "may take those actions authorized by law to pre-
vent the location of a Wal-Mart or other 'big box' department store
within the city's municipal corporate limits or the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. ' 121 Miller filed a lawsuit for declaratory relief to declare vested
rights to develop the property as of October 24, 2004. Wal-Mart failed to
close on its purchase contract, and Helotes argued in its plea to the juris-
diction that the controversy was therefore moot.
122
Miller argued that his property remained in controversy because there
still remained a development project for which a determination of his
rights was necessary. 12 3 His argument was that the city's zoning actions
should not apply to his property because he initiated the development
prior to the city's annexation. 124 The court held that Miller submitted
sufficient permits to initiate a commercial development project.1 25 Miller
claimed that he now intends to develop the property with a large retail
store other than Wal-Mart as the anchor tenant. According to the court,
this evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether Miller's
current intent to develop the property is the same as his intent when the
permit applications for Wal-Mart were submitted. 126 Accordingly, it
would have been improper to have granted Helofes's plea to the jurisdic-
tion and dismiss the lawsuit. 127
In TSP Development, Ltd. v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission,128 TSP Development, Ltd. ("TSP") filed with the Texas
Natural Resource Conservation Commission (the "Commission") a per-
mit to construct and operate a solid waste landfill in Chambers County.
The Commission determined that TSP's application was "administratively
complete" and began a "technical review" of the application.1 29 Cham-
bers County then enacted an ordinance which prohibited a landfill opera-
tion on TSP's property and the Commission returned the application to
TSP.130 Following an analysis of the Quick v. City of Austin 131 as it ap-
119. 243 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
120. Id. at 706-07.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 707.
123. Id. at 708.
124. Id. at 709.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 710.
128. 16 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
129. Id. at 149.
130. Id. at 150-51.
131. 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998).
1216 [Vol. 61
Zoning and Land Use
plied to the repeal of chapter 245's predecessor statute,1 3 2 the Austin
Court of Appeals held that all rights acquired by the developer of a pro-
ject at the time the initial permit was filed apply throughout the duration
of the project. 133 Therefore, the new ordinance therefore could not be
applied in the state agency review process. 134
In Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water
Conservation District No. 1,135 the landowner filed a 2002 application
with the Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District
(the "District") for drilling well permits. After the applications were
filed, the District amended its rules. The District argued that Texas Local
Government Code chapter 245 does not apply to groundwater protection,
but instead applies only to real estate development. 136 While the El Paso
Court of Appeals stated that it was "inclined to agree" with the District's
argument, it did not reach this issue on the grounds that chapter 245 is
superseded by chapter 36 of the Water Code. 137 According to the court,
"application of [c]hapter 245 would be inconsistent with [c]hapter 36 be-
cause it would require the District to apply old rules that are no longer
valid and that otherwise conflict with the regulatory requirements man-
dated under [c]hapter 36 . . ,,138
VIII. EXACTIONS
Greater New Braunfels Home Builders Ass'n v. City of New Braun-
fels139 addressed whether storm water connection fees were illegal
"drainage charges." 140 The Greater New Braunfels Homebuilders Asso-
ciation, among others, (collectively, the "developers") sought declaratory
judgment to invalidate ordinances adopted by the City of New Braunfels
("New Braunfels") that imposed fees for storm water development and
connections on all new developments. The ordinances required that
these fees be placed in a "stormwater connection fee fund."' 14 1 The trial
court denied relief, but on appeal the Austin Court of Appeals found that
New Braunfels failed to follow the statutory requirements of chapter 402
of the Texas Local Government Code, including publishing notices, hold-
132. Current version at TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 245.001 et seq. (Vernon 2005).
133. TSP, 16 S.W.3d at 153 ("One such acquired right is TSP's statutory right to have its
application considered by the commission solely on the basis of regulations and ordinances
in effect at the time TSP filed its application . .
134. Id.
135. 209 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006), rev'd, No. 06-0704, 2008 WL 2223209
(Tex. 2008). This case was overruled by the Texas Supreme Court prior to publication. See
Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth County Conservation Dist., 2008 WL 2223209 (Tex.
2008). Future Surveys may discuss the implications of this supreme court action.
136. Guitar Holding, 209 S.W.3d at 164; see TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 245.002-
.004 (Vernon 2005).
137. Guitar Holding, 209 S.W.3d at 165; see also TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.052
(Vernon 2008).
138. Guitar Holding, 209 S.W.3d at 165.
139. 240 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
140. Id. at 305.
141. Id. at 306.
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ing hearings, assessing drainage charges against all property owners
within the service area, and exempting lots on which no structures ex-
ist.1 42 By taking advantage of chapter 402, New Braunfels was required
to comply with the statute's procedural requirements. 143 The court re-
manded the case to the trial court to reconsider the Developers' request
for attorneys fees. 144
The necessity to protest an exaction prior to filing suit was addressed in
Rischon Development Corp. v. City of Keller.145 Rischon owned land
within the City of Keller which was zoned for single family residential
uses with a minimum lot size of 36,000 square feet. Rischon filed a rezon-
ing application for a planned development district for single family uses
with a minimum lots size of 14,100 square feet. During the process, the
city staff recommended additional conditions requiring Rischon to pay
for on-site water and sewer extensions, wrought iron perimeter fencing,
internal sidewalks, and fire sprinkler systems to be installed in certain
homes located more than 600 feet from Davis Boulevard. Rischon ac-
cepted all of these conditions without objection, and the rezoning applica-
tion was approved by the City Council. A preliminary plat was passed
which reinforced the fencing requirement. Rischon later entered into a
development agreement detailing how these different improvements
were to be paid for and installed. The development agreement contained
the same provisions as the planned development regulations and was ap-
proved by the City Council without Rischon's objection.146
Rischon later filed letters of complaint with the City of Keller to waive
some of these requirements, and Rischon twice filed for zoning amend-
ments, which were both denied.' 47 The court differentiated this case
from Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P.,'148 in which the de-
veloper objected to the regulations placed on it at every possible level of
review. 149 Rischon, on the other hand, accepted all of the provisions of
the development agreement. 150 Therefore, the court ruled that Rischon
had consented to the conditions and that "the trial court did not err by
rending a take-nothing judgment on Rischon's claims.' 151
142. Id. at 304; see TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 402.045 (Vernon 2005).
143. Greater New Braunfels, 240 S.W.3d at 309.
144. Id. at 311.
145. 242 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
146. Id. at 165-66.
147. Id. at 155-56.
148. 71 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002), aff'd, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
149. Id. at 25.
150. Rischon Dev., 242 S.W.3d at 168.
151. Id. at 169.
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